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The restructure of the Chaebol has been regarded as a prerequisite for restoring the
global competitiveness of the Korean economy. After barely r covering from the IMF crisis,
the domestic economy found itself facing a structural dilemma caused by the Chaebol.
During the rapid course of economic development in Kor a, the role of Chaebol was
justified as an economic energizer despite the sacrifices of small-medium sized enterprises
and the average tax payers. It is the Chaebol that pushed the economy onto the track of fast
growth. It is, however, also the Chaebol that pushed the economy into the turmoil of the IMF
crisis.  The conglomerates, in fact, had grown so large that they reached the point where they
could exploit the national economy for their wn b nefit. They had grown strong enough
even to place the financial industry under their control. The Chaebol enjoyed unrestrained
market power and expansion, which aused enormous damage to the Korean economy.
These harmful effects included: excessive and illegal debt financing; boundless expansion of
capacity; charging excessively high prices; driving rival firms and small industries out of
business through predatory tactics; suppressing technological improvements; persuading
government to restrict new entry or open market policies; speculation in real estate and the
stock market; and illegal inheritance or transfer of property.  This led to the ruin of the
national economy and eventually heralded the IMF crisis.
This paper analyzes the Chaebol problem and evaluates government policies in
conjunction with the IMF crisis in 1997. In addition, the paper discusses the new role of the
Chaebol in Korea’s business and economic system, suggesting appropriate policy measures
for enhancing competitiven ss and the constructive role of the Chaebol.
2. The Chaebol Economy
2.1 Engine for growth
In the initial stage of economic development in the 1960s and 70s, big firms worked
as an engine for fast economic growth. With exclusive government support and protection,
these big firms grew to be the Cha bol. The Chaebol led fast industrial growth via
monopolistic access to resources. The government gave th  right to engage in certain
businesses exclusively to the Chaebol. The government continuously employed an expansion
policy favoring the Chaebol in the form of financial assistance, low interest rates, tax
benefits, foreign exchange allocations, import and export licenses and foreign inv stment
incentives. In addition, small and medium sized firms, whose existence were heavily
dependent upon the Chaebol, provided them with quality parts and components at the lowest
cost possible in order to maintain a working relationship with the Chaebol. The
extraordinarily beneficial treatment by the government drove the Chaebol to develop the
relatively primitive economy at a fas r te, achieving an annual growth rate averaging 8%
over the last 40 years. Per capital income rose approximately 100 times fro  eighty dollars to
eight thousand dollars since 1962. In terms of gross domestic product, the Korean economy
now ranks 12th in the world.
However, Korea’s Chaebol-driven economy could not sustain growth. In 1997, the
domestic economy found itself impotent in surviving a harsh international market and could
not help but collapse from its own self-contradictions, resulting in the so- called “IMF crisis”.
3Figure 1:   Chaebol and Economic Growth
Table 1:  Chaebol Influence in the Korean Economy




Assets (billion won) 910,044 29.22 46.25
Liabilities (billion won) 736,584 29.79 47.94
Revenues (billion won) 875,156 32.29 45.94
Employees (thousands) 21,048 2.70 45.86
    Source: The Korea Center for Free Enterprise – An Affiliate of Federation of Korean Industries, 1998.12
2.2 Entrenched System
The Korean economic crisis was born of an entrenched system of government-
business collusion. For the past 40 years, political power and the Chaebol have existed in
symbiosis, linking preferential treatment and political funds. The politically powerful have
exercised their authority by handing over major projects and concessions to the Chaebol,
which, in return, have provide the slush funds politicians have needed to maintain their
political positions. Under this corrupt structure, he domestic economy has experienced fast
growth, but this has been merely an expansion of external structure without increasing core
strength. Further, the formation of this "food-chain" structure was accompanied by the
concentration of income in a high-ranking, vested-interest class. There has been littl
accumulation of solid technology. The basic framework of industrial development in Korea
has consisted of assembling imported components and equipment using low cost labor f
exports. Accordingly, the Korean economy has the character of a subordinated economic
system, one augmenting the benefits of advanced industrial countries rather than that of the
Korean people. Thus, the Korean economy, contrary to its proclamation of promoting fierce
competition following the entry to the WTO in 1995, in fact lost its competitiveness. Du  to a
lack of technology, the Korean export base has crumbled and the economy has underg ne













4critical shortage in the foreign exchange reserve needed to fight back. The economy was
caught in crisis.
Figure 2:  Government - Chaebol Collusion
The serious dilemma in Korea is that despite changes in government, the Chaebol
remain the same, and their influence grows ever stronger. Whenever a new regime steps in,
the Chaebol demonstrate their power to control this ew environment. There has been no
political regime that did not require Chaebol help to win election. Accordingly, these regimes,
could not help but take a humble posture toward the Ch ebol, granting them the special
treatment that, in the end, got the Chaebol what they wanted. The public protested
continuously and ultimately defeated the dictatorship government, and the civilian
government was finally born in 1993. Naturally, the civilian government was expected to
disperse the economic power of the Chaebol. Yet, Chaebol power has continued under the
new government. While promoting globalization as the goal of its administration, the civilian
government placed its economic policy focus on the revitalization of the Ch ebol. Its simple
economic logic was that strengthening national competitiveness must inevitably be entrusted
to the Chaebol.
Even if we set aside exposure of government-business collusion, it is clear that in
order to ensure technological predominance, establish a high value-added economic system
and lead the way to balanced economic development, there must be a diversification of
economic power. This means that instead of big business groups aiming at “octopus style”
external growth, Korea should strengthen the development of small and medium sized
“grassroots” companies. The civilian government, nevertheless, while making international
competitiveness its new policy target, had n glected to sever the government-business links,

















53. The IMF Crisis
3.1 Overall
The fragile, Chaebol-structured economy was hit hard by the financial and currency
crisis of 1997 and 1998, the so-called IMF Crisis. Few had expected the currency crisis to
impact so harshly on the domestic economy. The financial crisis has virtually forced the
collapse of industries in both the financial and real sectors of the economy. During the
turmoil, asset prices plunged as much as 40% to 60%, worseni g the financial status of
domestic firms and financial institutions, leading to market failure and a domino effect of
bankruptcies. The concurrent falls of industrial firms and financial institutions led many t
fear the collapse of the economy. Worst of all, national foreign exchange reserves wer
depleted to 3.9 billion dollars, pushing the country into an economic standstill.
Foreign debt exceeded 150 billion dollars, or four thousand dollars per capita. It had
almost quadrupled uring the period 1993-1997 from some 40 billion dollars, making the
country nearly insolvent. Given this excessive foreign debt, the depletion of the foreign
exchange reserve resulted in a virtual national liquidity crunch. The economic crisis also
triggered a social crisis, w th the rising unemployment of 2 million workers or 8.6% of the
total work force.  Social instability mounted with a sharp decline in growth rate from 7% to -
5.8%.
Figure 3 - The IMF Crisis
3. 2 Overinvestment
Overinvestment was the core problem for the Chaebol economy. For the fast growing
economy, highly leveraged investment was regarded as a necessity to exploit  growth
potential. However, in retrospect, too much investment was channeled to areas facing
excessive competition, speculative activities, and a poor return of the investments. The
         Government–Chaebol Collusion
Irregularities & Corruption
Foreign Debt
Liquidity Crisis & IMF Bailout
      Market Failure
Concurrent Collapses
Industrial Firms Financial Institutions
6average annual return on assets of manufacturing firms were below 1% during the 1990s, and
the average return on equity was just over 5%. Th  EBIT-to-Sales ratio was –0.3%, which
showed a sharp contrast with 8.3% in the U.S., 5.1% in Taiwan, and even with 3.4% in Japan.


































  Source :  Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, 1997.1-1999.12
 *indicates highest or lowest records after breakout of IMF crisis in December 1997
High investment rates re not a problem as long as domestic savings can support
such levels of investment. However, savings as a proportion of GDP remained 2 to 6% below
the rate of investment, and the gap widened during the 1990s. As Stiglitz(1998) argues, the
marginal productiveness of an economy at this rate of investments cannot be so high as to
justify the foreign debts incurred to fill the investments-savings gap.
The quantity and quality of investment in Korea was not the only concern; how the
investment was funded was another matter that affected the course of the crisis. Most private
sector investments relied on debt-form financing either from domestic or foreign sources.
Korean Chaebols maintained debt ratios over 400% and their interest payment costs out of
sales exceeded 6% as compared with 2 to 3% of competing firms in o her countries.
Huge non-performing loans provide furth r evidence of inefficient investment. As of
June 1998, the Non-performing Loan (NPL) ratio for Korea was 21%. Large portions of loans
by non-bank financial institutions were extended to failing conglomerates. Even before the
financial crisis, five of the 30 largest conglomerates went bankrupt, creating $2 billion n bad
loans, amounting to almost two thirds of the total capital of commercial banks in Korea.
3.3 Corporate Governance
The crippled corporate governance structure in Korea is a critical source of
mismanagement. The management of large corporations was controlled largely by a few
monopolistic owners who were usually connected to political leaders. Investment decisions
were based not on economic feasibility, but on the private interest of the owners. The
management of a large corporate was monopolized by the founder and /or his family, who
alone appointed the members of the board of directors. M nority shareholders were generally
silent and ignored partly due to their lack of concern for the long-term performance of their
7firms, and to prohibiting legal procedures against mismanagement. Externally, the market for
corporate control was still in an early stage of development due to the government’s policy to
protect the existing management, low labor market flexibility, and the traditional corporate
culture of identifying firms with their founding fathers.
In addition to the extreme conflict of interest between owner-managers and minority
shareholders, flimsy accounting standard  poor auditing systems also lowered the level of
management transparency, and hindered the sound d velopment of capital markets. The
underdevelopment of capital markets increased firms’ dependency on banking credits as the
major source of funds, and increased instability in he economy.
3.4 Financial Crisis and Foreign Debt
The problem of overinvestment i  the real sector would not have occurred had th
financial sector had shown some discretion in credit allocation. The driving force supporting
overinvestment was credit expansion, either through domestic financial institutions or
through foreign sources. High liability ratios verify this fact. (Table III)
The lack of discretion on the part of financial institutions as resource allocators was
partly attributed to government’s involvement in the management of financial institutions and
implicit safety nets. The government was directly involved in allocating financial resources
and maintained strong control ver both on the financial and real sector until the crisis
emerged. It controlled interest rates, specified the business scope of financial institutions, and
even specified their manpower, branch networks and capital, for example.  Despite the
extensive financial reform process of the 1990s, the government still maintained its influence
over these institutions through implicit guidance channels.
There was also an incentive problem on the part of the government officials dealing
with financial institutions. They benefited from the control and red tape while incumbent and
even after retirement, as they could safely land management jobs in he financial institutions
they used to control. To perpetuate these b nefits, control over financial institutions tended to
persist and financial reform measures were superficial in content. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the extensive financial reforms implemented during the 1990s turned out to be
a failure, leading to the financial crisis. Not only were these reform measures perfunctory, but
they also underestimated critically the importance of supervisory functions and prude tial
regulations that should accompany any financial deregulation.
Existing prudential regulations usually aimed at restricting specific behavior of
financial institutions, but did not amounto maintaining a sound level of capital adequacy to
protect the institutions. Furthermore, these prudential regulations were based mostly on ex-
post approaches so that authorities intervened in problematic institutions only after their
financial conditions became out of control. The result of the paternalistic policy of the
government was the mounting non-performing loans of financial institutions, including
commercial banks. Under the government safety umbrella, financial institutions pursued
high-risk-high-return strategies, and did not worry much about the credit worthiness of their
corporate customers.
Excessive intervention by the regulatory authorities injured the governance of
financial institutions. Political connections usually played an important role in the
8Table 3:   Characteristics of the major business groups
In-group ownership is the average, weighted by capital, of family ownership (shown in
second column) in each company in the group plus the shares of subsidiaries.









































































































































































































































9appointment of the management of financial institutions, and managers, thus,were obliged to
offer loans to the firms connected to those protégés. Such misconduct was closely related to
the government’s exclusion of shareholders in the governance of commercial banks.
Shareholders were also excluded from exercising their ownership rights. In Korea, it was
only in 1997 that outside directors representing shareholders could influence the appointment
of board members. In the absence of shareholder monitoring, bank ma agement was
generally obliged to provide ‘policy-directed’ or ‘politically favored lending’ to corporate
customers.
 Nor were depositors worried about their savings, since there existed a general belief
that financial institutions would never be permitted to fail. They even shifted their funds into
failing financial institutions, which offered high interest rates to avoid liquidity problems
after the financial crisis broke out. Such a lack of market discipline also worked to bolster
moral hazard in the management of financial institutions, leading to the pursuit of high risk
investment.
Another problem that increased economic risk is the sticky exchange rate system.
Korea has maintained a floating rate system with a band since 1990. Under its Market
Average Exchange Rate (MAR) system, the Korean won has supposedly been allowed to
move freely against the U.S. dollar according to market forces, wi h a maximum movement
of plus/minus 2.25% against the previous day’s closing price. However, the economic policy
that placed the first priority on the competitiveness of its export sector forced the monetary
authority to intervene frequently in the market and to maintain stable exchange rates. During
the first half of the 1990s, the real effective exchange rate of the Korean won d preciated
unlike other countries facing the crisis, partly due to the appreciation of the Japanese yen
during the period, but mainly due to the government’s determination to support the export
sector. The mounting balance of payments surplus due to the increasing exports forced the
monetary authority to engage in a massive sterilization operation by issuing the Monetary
Stabilization Bonds (MSBs) on a large scale, leading to a vicious circle of higher interest
rates and large inflow of foreign capital. The overflow of liquidity helped to cause asset
bubbles in the economy and increased overall risk with rising debt pendency.
The foreign reserve of a country versus its foreign debt has a kind of built-in safety
mechanism since the government’s effort to maintain a stable exchange rate, usually pegged
to the U.S. dollar, renders the central ba k to accumulate foreign reserves as capit l inflows
increase. However, in Korea, such a system did not work, as the weakening competitiveness
of the real sectors tended to depreciate the currency, reducing the needs for currency
purchases. The accumulation of foreign reserves did not match the increase in foreign debt.
Korea presented a very interesting case in that it had posed as an example of how an
underdeveloped conomy could become an economy with the 11th largest GDP and trading
volume in the world (prior to the crisis).  Korea was recognized to have world-class
competitiveness in semi-conductors, shipbuilding, car manufacturing, and chemicals. Its
highly educated, hardworking labor force and sound social infrastructure, having also made a
smooth transition from a military to a democratic gove nment worked to make it an OECD
member country in 1996.  However, it could not avoid the financial crisis that swep e East-
Asian countries mainly due to its rising foreign debt, evaluated at over 150 billion U.S.
dollars, including ashort term debt of some 60 billion US dollars. Of course, a majo  portion
of the foreign debt had been acquired by the Chaebol. Unlike the other economies  facing the
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crisis, there was no massive currency attack on theK rean won by currency speculators,
partly due to Korea’s underdeveloped foreign currency market. It was rather the financial
institutions making up a shaky financial structure, particularly foreign debt s ructures, that
triggered the financial crisis. Beginning in mid-October 1997, a several merchant banks and
commercial banks faced  severe liquidity crunch in firi gaccounts, partly due to the frozen
investments in East-Asian countries, and they were unable to rollover short-term debt. With
limited foreign reserves, the Korean monetary authority could only expan  the daily band for
currency movements from +2.25% to 10%.
Table 4:  Short-term Foreign Debt & Foreign Reserves
                                                                         ($ billion)
1997.12 1998.12 1999.12 2000.6
Short-term Foreign debt(1)63.9 30.7 38.1 47.5
Foreign Reserves(2) 8.9 48.5 74.1 90.1
(1) / (2) 716.6% 63.3% 51.5% 52.7%
Source:  Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, 1997.12-2000.6
Insolvent financial institutions, including commercial banks of substantial scale and
non-bank financial institutions uch as finance companies and securities firms had been
closed or were under the process of recapitalization. The restructuring of financial institutions
naturally has been followed by the bankruptcies or r capitalization of highly leveraged, high
risk industrial firms including the Cha bol. Most surviving financial institutions and
industrial firms have been also going through a painful process of organizational
restructuring. In the meantime, shareholders, debtors and management as well as employees
have paid for their share of mistakes, which has been unprecedented in the financial sector.
4. Chaebol Reform
4.1 IMF Rescue Program
Restructuring was no easy task. The program loans, evaluated to be aroun 150
trillion won or some 20% of total domestic cr dits, were 1.5 times more than the
government’s total annual budget. Thus, fiscal policy turned out to be unviable. Financial
markets were also no help. The stock markets had virtually collapsed. The bonds markets
were not developed enough to absorb bond issues of unprecedented scale. Allowing foreign
capital to own and manage the ailing domestic financial institutions and industrial firms was
another option, but fair deals rarely occurred because foreign investors feared the uncertain
economic prospects. Inevitably, the IMF b came involved in the Korean crisis as it did for
other countries in trouble. The IMF has promised to extend 57 billion dollars in rescue oans
to bail out the economy. The IMF rescue loans, however, were not without price. The IMF’s
conditions for financial support ranged from macroeconomic policy frameworks to structural
policies, including both financial and real sector reforms.
First, the IMF demanded lower growth rates, budgetary austerities, high levels of
interest rates, and reduced current account deficit, whose main purpose was to enforce swift
structural adjustment while providing an environment to recover foreign investors’
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confidence. Second, the IMF demanded comprehensive financial and industrial restructuring,
including closure of troubled financial institutions and industrial firms, and improving
accounting and disclosure rules. Third, the IMF demanded elimination of unfairness in
business and trade, including complete market opening both financial and real, elimination of
trade related subsidies, and promotion of labor market flexibility.
The IMF conditionality has incurred substantial costs. The fact that the Korean
economy experienced  a more severe contraction than even the IMF had expected at the time
of its assistance casts doubt on the appropriateness of the program. Under the IMF program,
the economy observed a steep rise in interest rates, a n gative growth rate, and a series of
corporate bankruptcies of unprecedented scale. The control on domestic credit growth was
especially dubious considering that the economy had already begun to contract even before
the crisis, and many firms with sound financial prospects faced credit crunches after the onset
of the crisis. The precipitated asset prices made it harder for the private sector to restructure
through the sale of their business lines. As the economy observed a series of bankruptcies,
increasing social instability due to increasing unemployment also threatened the political
system, further delaying the implementation of any reform plans devised by the government.
Criticism of the IMF is based on the argument that Korea had maintained sound
budgetary policies, unlike those of Mexico or s me European countries. In other words, the
Korean economy was basically suffering from private debt and microeconomic problems, not
from public debt or macroeconomic problems, and the IMF’s conditionality was of n  point
in the short run, and could be, in fact, detrimental in the longer run.
After experiencing extraordinary hardship, the Korean economy has survived the
crisis successfully, with the inflow of IMF rescue funds and foreign liquidity. The Korean
economy, stricken with a huge foreign debt, has struggled to a tract foreign capital. Korean
business firms, which borrowed heavily from foreign institutions, was forced to sell off assets
or subsidiaries to raise foreign currency and repay debt.  Korean firms also had been required
to downsize their operations in order to remain in business on a sound basis. As a result, a
growing number of foreign companies have penetrated the domestic market through direct
investment or the takeover of existing firms. The t end has forced Korean firms to speed up
their restructuring in order to stay afloat.
Total direct foreign investment in Korea now reaches some 15 billion dollars, while
indirect foreign investment through securities markets reaches 60 billion dollars. The share of
foreign investment in securities market counts for more than 30%. The foreign equity
holdings of leading firms in Korea, including Samsung Electronics, Daewoo Motor, Citizens
Bank of Korea, Korea Housing Bank etc. exceeds 50%. Inflow of foreign capital has helped
raise the foreign exchange reserve to 90 billion dollars, and has contributed to the fas
recovery of the Korean economy from the liquidity crunch.
The massive lay-off and drastic cut in wages, too, ha been a major contributor to
revitalize the collapsing economy. Some 1.8 million workers, or 8.6% of all workers, lost
their jobs. The huge cut in labor cost has helped the economy decisively to recover its high
growth rate. In 1999, the Korean economy recorded a high growth rate of 10.3% . Due t  this
high growth, the unemployment rate has fallen from 8.6% to 3.5%. The nationwide frugality
campaign has lso significantly reduced the consumption of foreign go ds and services, thus
helping the balance of payment restore a surplus. In 1998 and 1999, the Korean economy
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recorded an unprecedentdly high trade surplus, exceeding 40 billion dollars and 25 billion
dollars, respectively.
4.2 Restructuring Chaebol
The Korean economic crisis is far from over, although Korea seems to have avoided
the worst case scenario. The Chaebol have been always at the core of the economic problem.
Thus, unless the Chaebol are reformed, the economy can hardly restore international
competitiveness. The IMF has strongly called for the reform of the Chaeb l. The Kim Dae-
Jung government followed immediately IMF demands to streamline the Chabols’ ever-
expanding businesses acknowledging that they had been pri cipally blamed for the nation’s
economic crisis. The government has imposed five rules for Chaebol reform — jbusiness
consolidation into c re competence areas kcapital structure improvement lelimination of
cross-debt guarantee menhancement of management transparency nimprovement of
management accountability. The government stipulated that the five rules are pivotal in
inducing a full recovery from the country’s economic crisis, and that they will be a platform
for the corporations’ transformation into globally competitive companies.
Later, the government added three more rules to correct undesirable Chaebol
practices — jReduction of indirect cross ownership kprevention of anti-competitive
intragroup transactions and unlawful insider trading lp evention of the evasion of
inheritance and gifts taxes. Thu , the so-called “five plus three rules” have been imposed for
Chaebol reform by the government.  Two and a half years into the government driven reform,
however, the Chaebol’s problematic structure, blamed for the 1997 foreign exchange crisis,
remains virtually unchanged. On the surface, the Chaebol and the government have claimed
remarkable accomplishments in terms of reduction in the number of affiliates, debt ratios and
foreign capital attraction.
However, statistical evidence indicates little has come of the top conglomerate’s
efforts to weaken inter-unit dependence and end internal cross financing and control by
founding families, which defy fundamentally the government’s eight point reform rules. The
degree of inter-subsidiary dependence at the top Chaebol has, in fact, deepened over the last
years, indicating that their much-criticized fleet-like, sprawling structures remain intact.
According to consolidated financial data for fiscal 1999 released by the government in
August 2000, cross-subsidiary transactions accounted for more than 30% of total sales in 16
local Chaebol. The Samsung Group showed the highest ratio of inter-unit trading. Samsung’s
159 units reported 148.17 billion won in total sales, of which 61.73 trillion won, or 41.7%,
came from intra-group transactions. Internal trading by the Hyundai group stood at 38.1%,
followed by the LG group at 38.0% and the SK group at 36.1%. The average ratio of intra-
group transactions to total sales by the second-tier Chaebol was lower at 13.4%.
At the end of last year, the nation’s top four family-controlled conglomerates, or
Chaebol, reduced their debt-to-equity ratios below 200% at the order of the government. The
debt-to-equity ratios of the four business groups – Hyundai, Samsung, LG and SK – averaged
172.9%, a remarkable improvement from a year earlier when the figure hovered above 300%.
According to the combined financial statements, however, the low debt-to-equity ratios
achieved are quite misleading.
Of the top four conglomerates, Hyundai Group affiliates’ debt-to-equity ratio stood at
296% at the end of 1999, but fell to 229.71% without its financial units. Samsung showed
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443.77% with financial units and 194.04% excluding them. LG’s overall debt ratio stood at
357.60%, falling to 273.15% excluding its financial units; while SK’s marked 254.87% with
financial units and 227.59% without them.  The combined financial statement merges the
assets, liabilities, net worth and operating accounts of all companies under the effective
control of a group owner-chairman, meaning that nonexistent equities and turnovers created
through inter-unit transactions evaporate.  Imposition of tough accounting rules is part of the
government’s broad effort to enhance Chaebol financial transparency and dismantle their
family-controlled governance structure.
4.3 Bureaucratic Approach
The government continues to maintain its influence over the economy, contrary to
president Kim’s original call for a market-oriented economy. The Chaebol reform plan
undertaken by the government is fu damentally flawed, in that it is a bureaucratic order.
Rather than forcing reform based on political considerations, the government’s task should be
to establish a fundamental framework that will allow market forces to bring reform
autonomously.
The government’s goal of fortifying competitiven ss by reducing debt ratio below
200% is a worthy object. The reduction of debt ratios may force the conglomerates to sell off
subsidiaries and assets or attractequity capital, domestic as well as foreign, to pay back the
debt, thus bringing about business streamlining, risk reduction and improvement of
management accountability. To meet the deadline for the uniform debt ratio requirement,
however, the conglomerates have engaged in all kinds of irregularities. Paradoxically, the
conglomerates’ mishaps have destroyed the reform.
On the whole, companies in Korea have had high debt ratios. Not only were bank
loan interest rates low, but banks were unwilling to close down insolvent companies and
instead provided additional relief funding. Furthermore, by increasing borrowing, major
shareholders could hoard profits and also retain management rights over the company.
Considering the low interest rate environment and a system where relief funds are provided
when trouble arises, it is natural that a high debt corporate structure is created.
As Korea’s industrial development was oriented toward large conglomerates, debt ratios of
companies were extremely high. The borrowing proclivity made it appear s though banks
were simply private cashboxes owned by the Chaebol and this led to the monopolizing of
profits by the Chaebol. Inevitably, an industrial structure where competitiveness was
concentrated among the Cha bol was erected.  With the opening of Korea’s conomy and
efforts to compete globally in this state of high debt, the corporate-oriented lending practice
by the banking sector caused a weakening of the banks themselves. The economic
liberalization and heightened competition diminished the competitiveness of banks and in
turn they lost the capacity to keep companies afloat. The corporate and financial sector
arrived at a situation where both could collapse and in th process, owing to the insufficient
foreign currency holdings, the IMF crisis ensued. Ultimately, a structural problem was the
main culprit with both banks and companies almost going bankrupt.
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Table 5:  Chaebol Intragroup Transactions
(unit: trillion won)
Total sales Intragroup sales
Total DomesticOverseas Total Domestic Overseas





































































































Source: The Financial Supervisory Service (FSS), Aug. 2000
Financial and corporate structural reform has been implemented in order to correct
this structural deficiency and overcome the IMF crisis. Companies that have been overly
dependent on banks should reduce their debt to acceptable levels while introducing a prudent
management policy. From this standpoint, the government’s d bt ratio reduction policy is a
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sensible one. However, the problem is why 200% and why by the end of last year? Setting  a
uniform 200% debt ratio criterion and forcing companies to observe this requirement does
not follow economical rationale and can only be explained as being a bureaucratic show of
strength. The more pressing issue is why force the reduction by the end of last year?
There are many ways to reduce the debt ratio, but one of the most feasible methods is
to issue shares in the stock market and, at the same time, raise foreign capital. The proceeds
generated will, of course, be used to repay debt. However, demanding that all companies
satisfy the debt ratio criterion by the year’s nd generates a predicament wherein the market
cannot support itself. Yet, th  government has pushed for the deadline to be met and naturally,
companies must endure a very difficult situation.
As a result, rights issues were carried out under unfavorable conditions and healthy
companies were sold at dirt-cheap prices, even to foreign entities, and this has become a
problem. In sum, the objective was well-intentioned but the approach was wrong.  As
Chaebol companies could not satisfy the original 200% debt ratio criterion for each affiliate,
the Chaebol protested; and this led the government to change its requirement and apply the
ratio to the group as a whole. This has also caused a serious problem.
Obviously, there is no persuasive reasoning for forcing groups to satisfy uniformly
the 200% guideline, as each Chaebol group is different, both structurally and business-wise.
The more serious problem is bas cally, that the message here is to meet the 200% criterion by
making healthier companies buy up weaker ones. This, i  fact, legitimizes the collective,
extended management system. Efforts are now being made to break up the web-like Chaebol
business system, introduce professional management and bring sweeping reform; but
conceptually the government is retrogressing.
The government’s obstinate attempt to lower the debt ratio within the deadline has
led the Chaebol to use false tactics, so- alled, circulatory investments. Circulatory investment
occurs when company A invests into B, B into C, C into B and B into A. Under his scenario,
no actual investment has been made but capital appears to have increased on the books.
While internal ownership ratios are soaring and solidarity among Chaebols’ affiliated
companies is strengthening, the effect may be o give Chaebol chairmen even stronger control
of their kingdoms. In the process, minority stockholder rights, even for publicly listed
companies, have been ignored without esitation. Today, it is feared that presure on the
Chaebol is weakening and they will be able to act with impunity. This will allow the current
insular management and ownership structure to continue and bring on greater possibilities for
Chaebol control.
With respect to small and medium sized companies, the most essential goal of
Chaebol reform is to encourage competitiveness and allow them to survive on their own. Yet,
since the restructuring process, the economic concentration of the top four Chaebol has rather
increased. In terms of revenue, compared with past levels of total revenue, the Cha bol
portion has grown larger. Subsequently, the small and medium sized companies are losing
ground, and the disarray of the Cha bol may further aggravate difficulties. It is
understandable that the government had no choice but to use strong-arm tactics to push for
Chaebol reform; however, no matter how difficult or pressing the matter is, one should
tighten the girth before riding the horse. Chaebol reform ust be implemented for economic
reasons, not political ones.
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4.4 Public Price
Given the failure in Chaebol restructuring how could the economy survive the
financial crisis and restore the high economic growth rate? On  major tool used by the
government for fast recovery was the injection of public funds.  At the outbreak of the IMF
crisis, the government estimated bad debts of financial institutions to be 118 trillion won or
some 110 billion US dollars, which was nearly 1.3 times the national budget at that time.
Then, the government issued 64 trillion worth of g vernment bonds to be used for resolving
bad debt and restructuring financial institutions, proclaiming that the bond issue would be
enough to rebuild a sound financial industry. Actual injection of public funds, however, has
reached 107 trillion won, far exceeding the target. Nevertheless, the financial industry
remains fragile and continues to be haunted by the spectre of the financial crisis. In fact,
despite the huge price paid by the public, there exist virtually no sound banks, merchant
banks, investment companies, or s curities dealers in Korea.  As a result, the real sector of the
economy remains unstable.
The fall of the Daewoo group provides evidence that improper Chaebol reform has
caused enormous public loss. By injecting 107 trillion won of public funds into the ailing
financial institutions, the government could have pushed ahead reform plans, i cluding the
shut-down of unhealthy institutions, downsizing of organizations, dismissal of idle
workforce, institution of foreign investment incentives, improvement of capital structure,
merger & acquisitions, etc,, thus helping the economy recover soundness and competitiveness
at a faster rate than expected.
However, the sudden fall of Daewoo gr up, which was the second largest in Korea in
terms of asset size, has ruined the restructuring efforts. There is not a single Korean financial
institution unaffected by Daewoo. Domestic investment, trust, a d investment trust
management companies have been especially hard hit as a substantial volume of Daewoo
paper was incorporated into their financial products. The fall of Daewoo group has produced
bad debts estimated roughly to be equal 90 trillion won. Hurt by the Daewoo fall, most of the
incumbent financial institutions returned immediately to the state of insolvency experienced
during the IMF crisis. It is a pity that the government did not disband Daewoo right after the
IMF crisis. By delaying the reform for nearly two years, the government has actually nurtured
the Daewoo disaster.
No matter how difficult or how long it takes, restructuring should take place under
market mechanisms between financial institutions and companies. In actuality, however, the
government has injected public funds into distressed financial institutions and th s makes
them state-operated entities.  Chaebol reform is being implemented through those financial
institutions. The fact that financial institutions are implementing corporate reforms and that
those institutions are controlled by the government illustrates the con inu d bolstering of a
government-dominated system. If corporate reform is to be achieved through the financial
sector, financial institutions should be left alone, as this will lead them to demand Chaebol
reform. The government should not interferein the financial sector and should leave financial
institutions accountable for credit management and reduction of corporate debt. Most
importantly, the government should not continue to inject public funds. If the injection of
public funds is continued, financial institutions and companies will try to evade restructuring.
Nor should the government give orders on whether or not to dispense funds. If possible, the
government should preserve public funds and instead, construct a legal and systemic
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framework, which will push financial institutions and companies to implement corporate
reform in order to survive. Conversely, however, the government is directing the reform
process and this only means the return to a government-directed economy. Financial
institutions and companies are interlinked. Once the groundwork to force financial
institutions to conform to the principle of survival of the fittest is laid, the financial sector
will have no choice but to demand the corporate sector shape up in order to survive.
5. New Economic Paradigm
When designing a new economic structure, social and political influences hould also
be accounted for comprehensively. Until now, he political sector had a very negative
influence in the economy. Because the economy was controlled by the government, there was
collusion between the corporate and political sectors, which fostered rampant corruption.
Consequently, political authorities and the Chaebol “scratched each other’s backs,” with the
Chaebol being provided financial assistance, tax breaks and other benefits, while political
funds were given to the incumbent leadership. This led to the b lief that instead of earning
profit from business endeavors, particularly technological and product development, it would
be more lucrative to pr vide political funds and receive special favors in return. This led the
Chaebol to become bloated, and this is why fundamental surgery is necessary in order to
sever the link between money and politics.  A de isive overhaul of the political system is
urged to guarantee clean elections.
In order to sever government-business collusion at its root, the most urgent task is
governmental reform. The Korean government does not act as a public institution working for
the economy, but reigns as a powerful agency controlling the economy to serve political ends.
The government has mass-produced administrative rules as a means to control the economy
and companies are now so tangled up in the s iderw b of regulations, they can hardly move.
Worse, through devices such as tax investigations, administrative sanctions and financial
restrictions, the government threatens companies at every turn, making free and creative
business activities impossible. Viewed from the standpoint of competitiveness, the
government of our nation looks like the most backward, improperly run enterprise. It is
urgent that he government reform and correct its shortcomings.
The government has designed an improvident device to control the economy. Under
a government-directed economic system, the economy cannot develop properly and
government control prohibits the market from manifesting its genuine function. Hence,
regulations should be drastically reduced. Not only should the government trim its
organization, but a fundamental change in the government’s mind-set is crucial so that the
government exists to serve its citizens. Only then will the government cease its intervention
in the economy. The government’s influence and organization should be trimmed and an
economic climate cr ated that ensures fair and open competition.
As for reorganization of the government, the separation of money and administrative
powers is a precondition. No matter how it is reorganized and  specialized, the administrative
structure, if it has the power to issue and distribute money as it wishes, will develop
inextricable links with the business sector, reinforcing the sort of vicious circle which already
exists.  Should this happen, the economy will become hostage to the vested interests class and
suffer once more.
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From this standpoint, it is important to develop an independent central bank with the
authority to issue money. Often the central bank has bee compared to the heart in the human
body; the central bank supplies money, the blood of the economy, to enable the healthy
growth of the national economy. If the central bank is misused, the economy pays a high
price as the victim of bureaucracy and political fraud.
The Bank of Korea (BOK), Korea’s central bank, was deprived  entirely of
autonomy, beginning with t e military dictatorship of the 1960s. For 40 years, the BOK was
degraded to the status of a printing company, churning out money at the command of the
government. The natural outcome of this kind of government control was the excessive
issuance of currency and poor execution of economic policy.  It led also to unbalanced
economic growth and structural corruption. In the end, the BOK  drov the national economy
to collapse. Under these circumstancs, even if government structure is reorganized efficiently,
the roots of corruption remain intact and bureaucratic society becomes a hotbed of
irregularities.
In addition to the independence of the central bank, fin cial market function must
also be enhanced. Korea’s financial institutions have been vassals of the authorities and have
acted as the private cashbox of theChaebol. In capitalism, money is crucial. Just as the
human body depends on how well blood is refined and distributed, a healthy financial
industry requires money to be provided to healthy organs via well-maintained distribution
functions. In Korea, government influence in finance is becoming stronger. Although
distressed financial institutions are being closed, merged and sold overseas in homage to
financial reform, government influence is, in fact, being fortified. The advent of the
omnipotent Financial Supervisory Commission, in particular, is enlarging the source of non-
performing elements. The government should sever its chains of control.
As stated previously, the Chaebol must also change. The Chaebol are operating in
many businesses via substantial debt accumulation and this octopus-like approach has
reached a state where the Chaebol have become too big to manage effectively. A truly
specialized affiliate system, a lower debt ratio and the securing of competitiveness in relevant
sectors are important remedies.
The core of Chaebol policy must be the dispersion of ownership and the separation of
ownership and management. Since the Chaebol companies’ ownership has been concentrated
in the hands of the founder and his family, company activities have stressed the maximization
of private interests. If ownership is dispersed and ownership-management separation is
enforced on the basis of open and public Chaebol policy, the perception of a company as its
owner’s cash box will be erased.  Only then can companies concentrate their attention on
healthy, productive activities for consumers and shareholders, rather than o  the monopolistic
activities of the company owners.
It is urgent to preserve small, medium sized and venture industries, as th  base of a
competitive economy. The survival of small and medium sized companies depends on their
functioning as sub-contractors to the big companies. Under this system, it is difficult to save
them merely by creating an office providing some limited kinds of support. The Korean
Chaebol companies have concentrated on the pursuit of their monopolistic interests through
the development of goods-assembly production. They have systematically blocked the
development of capital resources and basic materials and knowledge based industries and
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deprived other industries of a place in which to stand. Consequently, the Korean economy
faces the loss of its international competitive power.  The fundamental way to solid growth is
to change the method of industrial development to that of a decentralized system with small
companies and big companies involved in acomplementary relationship. In this way, the
environment must be secured and small companies must be free to engage in creative
activities. A prerequisite to this is the blocking f  Chaebol companies’ domination.
Figure 4 - Chaebol Reform
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